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All evaluation exercises involve ethical values, as they require4
some conception of the “good life.” Evaluation of health tech-5
nologies is no exception. Because there is no consensus about6
what is a good life, we have to devise decision-making proce-7
dures in which citizens with different opinions are heard and8
treated fairly (1). The purpose of health technology assessment9
(HTA) is to offer useful input into this process so as to increase10
the quality of the deliberations and of the resulting decisions.11
How to bring ethical values into this process?12
This question is most often inspired by some uneasiness13
about the dominance of economic evaluation. This has led to14
an unfortunate opposition of “economic” and “ethical values.”15
Everything that is not included in standard economic evalua-16
tion is then called “ethical”—ranging from distributional issues17
to bioethical concerns about the acceptability of specific tech-18
nologies. One ends with a long list of ethical questions, with19
the added proviso that even this long list is not complete and20
with the explicit acceptance that different observers will answer21
them differently (2).22
This leads to an unequal playing field. At one side, one has23
what looks like a “hard science” approach, with a well-defined24
methodology, involving sophisticated technical questions, giv-25
ing unambiguous answers—and apparently supported by a large26
majority of analysts. At the other side, a bunch of soft arguments27
about disparate questions, without clear answers, and put for-28
ward by analysts who disagree about how to tackle the issues.29
No wonder that the first side dominates the scene. This is not to30
say that decision makers always follow the economic evaluation31
results. Yet, even if they have good reasons to diverge, this often32
gives an impression of adhockery.33
If we want to change that situation, the first thing to do is34
to communicate that the “hard” approach is not as hard as it35
looks. Rather than opposing “economic” and “ethical” values,36
one should emphasize that economic evaluation implements a37
narrow set of ethical values. In fact, many agree that “maxi-38
mizing the unweighted sum of QALYs” is at best an imperfect39
approximation of what would be an ethically desirable objective40
function for society. Sociologists of science can investigate the41
paradox that a consensus has grown to implement an objective42
function about which there is near consensus that it is not a good43
one. My hunch is that what makes the framework attractive are44
its strong analytical foundations.45
Yet, one can keep these analytical foundations and still in- 46
troduce broader ethical considerations into the analysis. One 47
just has to interpret “outcomes” and “costs” in a broader way. 48
Why limit the analysis to QALYs? It is perfectly possible to 49
introduce other measures of health, to make the definition of 50
health multidimensional, or even to go beyond health and con- 51
sider the effects of the health technology on other dimensions of 52
the good life (such as autonomy, the quality of social relations, 53
and income). And why take an unweighted sum? Introducing 54
refined distributional weighting is technically easy. Including 55
equity and a broader measure of individual outcomes into the 56
analysis would already take up a large part of what now are seen 57
as “ethical” concerns. 58
If it is technically feasible, and if there is consensus that 59
the unweighted sum of QALYs is too restrictive, why is this 60
broader framework not used? First, data are missing on the 61
effects of specific technologies on important dimensions ofwell- 62
being, differentiated for different groups in society. Yet, there 63
is no reason why such information could not be collected in a 64
scientifically valid way. Putting richer information on the table 65
would immediately change the format of the debate. The first 66
requirement to improve the ethical content of the debate is to 67
invest in richer data collection. 68
Second, if we broaden the scope of the analysis, unam- 69
biguous conclusions will no longer be possible. Opinions differ 70
about what is equitable and about what dimensions of life to in- 71
clude. One then necessarily has to resort to a sensitivity analysis, 72
in which one produces a series of results, each corresponding 73
to a specific ethical position. The analyst can only show the 74
range of possible choices and explain how they are driven by 75
the choice of value judgments. Yet, this is exactly how it should 76
be. If there is no consensus about crucial normative choices, 77
HTA should not create the misleading impression that there is 78
one (and certainly not create a feeling of safety by using an 79
objective function that almost nobody likes). 80
All I said until now rested on the conviction that it is cru- 81
cial not to narrow down “consequentialism” to “welfarism” 82
(or, worse, utilitarianism), and that most ethical values can be 83
integrated in an extended consequentialist framework. Indeed, 84
extended consequentialism can go much further than what I 85
described above. Even rights may be treated as goals and con- 86
sequential analysis based on comprehensive outcomes can take 87
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note of processes and freedoms exercised (3). Of course some88
deontological arguments cannot be handled within extended89
consequentialism. Bioethicists may object to the use of certain90
technologies, whatever their positive side-effects. These abso-91
lute principles act as strict constraints on the choices and they92
can be analyzed as such.93
I conclude. The best strategy to introduce ethical values is94
not to formulate a long list of questions to “complement” the95
economic evaluation. Nor is it helpful to question the idea of96
formal evaluation. Broader ethical values will only be taken se-97
riously if they are integrated in the formal evaluation exercise98
itself. This is possible in an “extended consequentialist” per-99
spective. Many reasons have been formulated to not follow that100
route. Some take a broad critical stance on the societal role of101
health technology and ofHTA, some are afraid to reduce qualita-102
tive considerations into quantitative measures (this fear is based103
on a misunderstanding: ranking without measuring is often suf-104
ficient), some believe that too much technical analysis makes105
the debate nontransparent. All these reasons are understandable,106
but those who use them should then not be disappointed that 107
their influence on the decisions remains minimal. 108
Two final pragmatic remarks. First, what I have sketched 109
is a long-run perspective. In the short run, a kind of Socratic 110
approach is probably the best we can do. Yet, the ambition to 111
extend and improve the present techniques of economic evalu- 112
ation and to collect richer data should become an essential part 113
of the exercise. Second, I am well aware that convincing practi- 114
tioners of economic evaluation to take up a broader perspective 115
will require an uphill battle. Ethicists that talk the language of 116
economic evaluation are badly needed. 117
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